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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

W. E. A. CREDIT UNION,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

/
/
/

vs.

Case No. 14561
/

PAULA PACE,
/

Defendant and
Appellant.

/
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This was an action brought by the Respondent, who was
the Plaintiff in the Lower Court on an Order To Show Cause, why
the Court should not order the Appellant, who was the Defendant
in the Lower Court, to deliver up to the Respondent property
upon which the Respondent claimed to have a lien upon a secured
transaction entered into which pledged security was allegedly
signed by both the Appellant and her spouse.

The present

Complaint and Order To Show Cause before the Court being an
action against the Appellant only and did not have joined with
it the spouse of the Appellant.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Lower Court did grant to the Respondent the right
to possession of the home furnishings of the Appellant without
having joined in said cause of action the husband of the Appellant
and without the granting of an opportunity to the Appellant
to post surety or bond for continued possession of the furnishings of the home and without granting to Appellant the right
of a Due Process trial*
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks reversal of the granting by the
Lower Court of an Order on Order To Show Cause, granting to
the Respondent a right to immediate possession of the home
furnishings of the Appellant/ utilizing the contempt powers
of a Lower District Court granting possession of the property
of the Appellant to the Respondent prior to the right of a
Due Process hearing and adjudication of the rights of the husband#
who was not a party in the Lower Court/ in affect, granting
an action of replevin prior to adjudication and Judgment of
a Due Process hearing and without opportunity to the Appellant
for the posting of a bond and in any way protecting the property
rights of the Appellant and her spouse prior to seizure by
a Sheriff in Weber County under orders of the Lower Court.
-2-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant and her spouse, Rudolph Pace, entered
into a Promissory Note and Security Agreement with the Respondent
on April 9, 1974. (R-19).

The Respondent brought suit against

the Appellant only, not naming the husband of the Appellant
in the Lower Court Complaint* (R-1)
The Respondent brought an Order to Show Cause seeking
Summary Replevin of the home furnishings which was the property
of both thfe Appellant and her husband. (R-33)
An Order was signed and issued by the Lower Court on
April 1, 1976, directing the Sheriff of Weber County to take
possession of the security, which was the property of both
the Appellant and her husband, Rudolph Pace.

Only the wife,

namely the Appellant herein, was a party to the action in the
Lower Court (R-31).

The Writ of Replevin was issued on April 1/

1976, by the Clerk of the Lower Court, together with a Precipe
for possession of the merchandise of the Appellant and her
spouse, Rudolph Pace (R-32).

The Court issued the Writ of

Replevin prior to trial and without necessity of the posting
of bond as required under Rule 64B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended 1953. (R-33)
The spouse of the Appellant had previously filed Bankruptcy
in the United States District Court for the District of Utah,
-3-

Northern Division, on October 5, 1974, and was discharged in
Bankruptcy on November 3, 1975, (JR-14) . The Respondent herein
was a creditor scheduled in the Bankruptcy schedules of Rudolph
Pace (R-14).
The manager and treasurer of the Respondent testified
that the Security Agreement was in fact signed by the Appellant
and her spouse, Rudolph Pace CR-44), and further testified
that the Respondent knew of the Bankruptcy filed by the Appellant's
spouse, Rudolph Pace; that inasmuch as the Respondent's filing
"was invalid", no claim nor any attempt to obtain a Disclaimer,
or to file an action for fraud, or any other legal action was
taken by the Respondent in the Bankruptcy Court.

The Respondent's

witness further testified that the Appellant herein was released
from the first Security Agreement and that the items that were
on the first Security Agreement were added to the items which
were evidenced in the second Agreement, and that the second
Agreement was a re-write of the first Agreement and was written
so that the security of Rudolph Pace could be added into the
successive instrument, which was a secured instrument upon
which the Respondent herein brought its action in the Lower
Court. (R-46)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
HUSBAND CANNOT BE DEPRIVED OF HIS ESTATE WITHOUT
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Rudolph S. Pace is the husband of the Appellant in the
instant matter before this Court and was not a party-Defendant
to the action in the Lower Court/ and he will be referred to
hereinafter as the "husband".
The Legislature of Utahr in whom the Constitution vests
the exclusive right to enact law, has formerly declared in
Section 68-3-1/ Utah Code Annotated/ as amended 1953/ that:
The Common Law of England so far as it is not
repugnant to or in conflict with the Constitution
or laws of the United States/ or the Constitution
or laws of this State *** is hereby adopted/ and
shall be the rule of decision in all Courts of
this State. (Emphasis supplied)
The Utah Supreme Court/ in applying a substantially
identical Wyoming Statute declared that "the Common Law of
England" so referred to refers to that law as of the date of
the Declaration of Independence on July 4/ 1776.

Johnson v.

Union Pacific Coal Company/ 28 Ut. 146; 76 P. 1089/ 1091 to
1093.
There isf of course/ nothing in the Utah Constitution
or Statutes repugnant to an estate by the entirety, and an
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estate by the entirety which includes the personal property
of a husband and wife, existed under the Common Law and has
been recognized in various statutes of the State of Utah as
still an existing entity.
78-41-1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1953, in
making reference to possible Estates existing in the State
of Utah, specifically refers to a tenancy by the entirety as
a possible Estate which would be affected by the termination
of a life estate in reference therein.
In setting forth the rules for determining the existence
of a partnership and to the type of estates that may exist
thereunder, the statutes state at 48-1-4(2), Utah Code Annotated,
as amended in 1953, the affect of particular statutes as to
a tenancy by the entireties.
The alleged secured agreement under which the Respondent
sought and obtained a Writ of Replevin in the Lower Court, as
attached to Plaintiff's Complaint (R-2), was signed by both the
Appellant and the husband, and was a re-write of a Security
Agreement entered into November 1, 1973, which was an instrument
drafted prior to the one upon which the Writ of Replevin was based
(R-46), and in accordance with the testimony of the Respondent's
only witness, was subscribed to by both the Appellant and her
husband in order to release the furniture as collateral on the
-6-

first loan and adding in the items set forth in the second
secured agreement, plus a substantial additional amount of
the home furnishings of the husband, was intended as a release
of the furniture as collateral on the first loan as testified
to by Respondent's witness (R-46).
The husband had previous to any prior action filed a
Petition in Bankruptcy and had been discharged at the time
of the action in the Lower Court (R-14).

The Respondent testified

that it did not file a claim nor seek to sustain its lien in
the Bankruptcy Court as against the husband, in that:
I discovered at the hearing in Bankruptcy, that
another finance company had a prior lien on the
subject furniture and that our filing was invalid.
(R-45)
There was, therefore, no claim of any kind made before
the Bankruptcy Court, either in allegation of a valid lien
as to the Respondent or her spouse nor an allegation as to
any fraud on the part of the husband or in regards to the alleged
secured loan held by the Respondent, wherein the household
furnishings of the Appellant and her husband was supposedly
security for a loan, in that the Respondent believed it could
not maintain a valid action of any kind in the Bankruptcy Court,
and, therefore, avoided any confrontation as to its allegations
of a secured loan or security at the time of the filing of
-7-

a Petition in Bankruptcy by the husband. (R-45)
There was no transfer of any estate as between the husband
and wife and the estate of the husband and wife was an estate
wherein each of the parties had an interest in the whole of
the tenancy and common ownership in their household furnishings
and was in the nature of an estate in personalty by the entirety.
A Common Law conveyance of property required a transfer
of title and the granting of the lien against the personal
property of the Appellant and her husband by reason of a secured
transaction created in the Respondent at most an "equitable"
or "lien" upon said property.

Title to the property remained

in the lienors and not in the Respondent.
The State of Utah has consistently held in regards to
real property mortgages/ that Utah is an "equitable" or "lien
theory" State and not that of a "title theory".

(See Thompson

v. Cheasman, 15 Ut. 43, 48 P. 477; Bybee v. Stuart, 159 P.2d
118 (1948).
At 27 A.L.R. 826, definition of a marital estate and
the nature of it is set forth as follows:
An estate of the entirety exists only between
husband and wife, being an outgrowth of the
marital relation based upon the theory of the
legal unity of the two; it is, however, a unit
of indivisible parts vesting in two distinct
persons (husband and wifel, who are, however,
-8-

regarded in law as one and the same. In this
regard, the estate differs from a joint tenancy.
Because of the indivisibility of the estate and
the fact that it vests absolutely in the survivor,
a very serious question has been presented as to
whether or not any portion of the estate may be
subjected to the payment of the individual debts
of one of the spouses.
An estate by the entirety is a form of co-ownership in
real and personal property held by husband and wife with right
of survivorship.

Its essential characteristic is that each

spouse is seized per tout et non per my; that is of the whole
or one of the entirety and not of a share, moiety, or divisible
part as was defined in Gasner v. Pierce, 286 Pa. 529, 134 A.
494; C.I.T. Corporation v. Flint, 333 Pa. 350, 5 A.2d 126.
It is, therefore, submitted that the act of the Respondent
in bringing an action against the Appellant only, without including
the husband in said action, could not destroy the interest
of the husband in the household furnishings and no possession
of the collateral of the property, which was the property as
much that of the husband as of the Appellant, could be achieved
and perfected without the husband being a party to such action.
It was held in Louis Licker, et ux, v. Gluskin, 164
N.E. 613, by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, that
the Common Law rights and disabilities of both husband and
wife attach to the interest and title of each arising under
-9-

a tenancy by the entirety, and that the tenancy of the husband
and wife in the entirety is essentially a tenancy modified
by the Common Law theory of unity of husband and wife, in that
they do not take by moieties, but by entireties.

The Court

further held that the characteristic of a tenancy by the entireties
at Common Law continues unaffected by the modern statutes designed
to ameliorate the rights of married women at Common Law and
to render more flexible and individual the property rights
of husband and'wife.

The Court further held:

That these indubitable Common Law rules require
the conclusion, that a creditor cannot do with
the right of a tenant by the entirety that
which the tenant cannot do.
POINT II
THE RIGHT OF THE BANKRUPT'S SPOUSE IS PROTECTED
BY THE SUPREMACY OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OVER THE
LAWS OF A STATE.
The Bankruptcy Act was created by Congress and the Bankruptcy
Act specifically sets forth in 11 U.S.C., Section 11, jurisdiction
and creation of Courts of Bankruptcy by stating:
The Courts of the United States hereinbefore defined
as Courts of Bankruptcy are hereby created Courts of
Bankruptcy and are hereby invested, within their
respective territorial limits as now established, or
as they may be hereafter changed, with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to
exercise original jurisdiction and proceedings under
this Act, in vacation, in chambers, and during the
respective terms, as they are now or may be hereafter
held, to -10-

It is necessary and should be emphasized that the power
to determine dischargeability of a particular claim upon the
application of a Bankrupt in the exceptional case, presently
resides in the Bankruptcy Court by virtue of a decision of
the Supreme Court in Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
The adoption of Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act as
reported by the National Bankruptcy Conference, wherein it
stated:
One of the strongest arguments in support of the Bill
is, that if the Bill is passed, a single Court, to-wit:
the Bankruptcy Court, will be able to pass upon the
question of dischargeability of a particular claim
and it will be able to develop an expertise in
resolving the problem in particular cases. The State
Courts1 Judges, however capable they may be, do not
have enough cases to acquire sufficient experience to
enable them to develop this expertise. Moreover,
even under the present system in the last analysis,
it is the United States Supreme Court, which has the
ultimate word on the construction of Section 17 of
the Bankruptcy Act. Section 17 makes provisions for
the debts to be released by discharge and those which
shall be excluded from a discharge. Since this is
a Federal Statute, the Federal Courts necessarily
have the final word as to the meaning of any terms
contained therein.
The United States Constitution in Article VI, Clause
2, provides that:
"This Constitution and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof *** shall
be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, anything in
the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding" is the basic roots wherein the
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Doctrine of Federal Pre-emption takes its roots and
the Bankruptcy Act is such a pre-emptive Act as is
binding upon all States.
The listing of the Respondent herein by the Appellantfs
spouse in his Bankruptcy schedule (R-14) gave to the Respondent
every opportunity to prove its right of title to the security
which it claimed and sets forth in its Complaint in the Lower
Court, and if in fact there was fraud on the part of the Bankrupt
in the Lower Court as to the financing and securing of the
home furnishings to the Respondent, the Respondent had not
only the opportunity, but the right to have its claim adjudicated
in the Federal Bankruptcy Court and to assert the Respondent's
right or entitle to the collateral which it now claims.
Phillips v. Krakower, 46 Fed.Rpt.2d 764 (Cir.Ct. of
Appeals, 4th Cir., 1931), the Court held that there is ample
authority for the proposition that where property is not reachable
through Bankruptcy, it can be reached by a creditor under State
laws, the Court of Bankruptcy should delay a granting a discharge
to the Bankrupt to enable the creditor to receive thereunder
in the State Courts.
294, 23 Sup.Ct. 751.)

(Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S.
The Respondent could, therefore, have

prevented the right of the Respondent being precluded from
further action in the State Court by an adjudication of the
Bankruptcy Court, that the husband would be an essential party,
together with the wife, in an action to seek property held
-12-

by the entirety or as tenants in common, thereby .preserving
the purported claim of the Respondent before trial in the State
Court by an adjudication in the Bankruptcy Court or in the
Second District Court protecting the Respondent and its alleged
interest in the home furnishings of the parties. In the prior
case, supra, the Court held as a matter of law, that the failure
of the secured party to join both the husband and wife in a
state action, prior to one of the spouses being discharged
in Bankruptcy, estopped further state action, in that neither
spouse can dispose of any part of the property without the
consent of the other and neither has such an interest in the
property as can be subjected to the lien of a Judgment for
his debts or as can be levied upon and sold under legal process
against the parties.
Ades v. Catlan, et ux, 132 Md. 66, 103 At. 94, action
wherein the husband and wife were tenants by the entirety and
wherein the husband was a Petitioner in Bankruptcy and was
discharged from the indebtedness as against him.

A creditor

attempt to levy upon the property interest of the wife in the
tenancy by the entirety, the Bankruptcy Court held an estate
of the wife could not be reached during the lifetime of the
husband, that there could be no severance of the estate.
Wharton v. Citizens Bank, 223 Mo.App. 236, 15 S.W. 860,
(1929) , the Court held that where Judgment was obtained against
-13-

the wife only, after the discharge of a husband in his voluntary
Bankrupt proceedings on a Note signed by both husband and wife,
it was held that the lands held by the husband and wife as
tenants by the entireties could not/ to any extent/ be subjected
to the payment of the Judgment against the wife during the
lifetime of the husband/ where the creditor made no attempt
to procure a stay of the husband's discharge in Bankruptcy for
a time sufficient to enable him to subject the property to
his claim.

The Court stated:

**If the Appellant had made application to the
Federal Court for permission to bring suit against
the Bankrupt for the purpose of subjecting the
estate by the entirety to the satisfaction of the
joint debt and for a stay of proceedings upon
the application for discharge until that suit
could proceed to Judgment/ the permission would
have been granted and the Discharge would have
been withheld. Then it could have obtained a
joint Judgment, which would have been a lien
upon the real estate held by the husband and wife
as tenants by the entirety. **The husband filed
his Petition in Voluntary Bankruptcy, that did
not prevent Appellant from proceeding to assert
its right, but has lost its right by default.
The Respondent in its Legal Memorandum to the Lower
Court attempted to allege the superiority of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code in the instant matter before the Court/
upon which a view has been expressed by Professor William E.
Hogan in Volume 17f Standford Law Review/ page 840, on "Future
-14-

Goods, Floating Liens, and Foolish Creditors", as follows:
At each turn, the Code attempts to improve the
position of the secured creditor as against the
unsecured creditors and the Trustee in Bankruptcy.
This is a sterile undertaking, because the avoiding
powers provided by the Bankruptcy Act under the
Federal Supremacy clause will prevail over the State
created rights of the Article 9 creditor.***
In the Matter of Fred Gilmer Saunders, Jr., Bankrupt,
No. 73-BK-20-R, 365 F.Supp. 1351, (U.S. Dist. Ct., Western
District, Virginia, 1973), the Court held that, under the laws
of the State of Virginia, property held by the entirety is
not subject to the claims of individual creditors of one of
the tenants; nor can either spouse acting alone transfer an
interest in the property.

The Court held, however, that the

Petitioner in this case was the holder of Notes signed by both
the Bankrupt and his wife, could reach the property held as
a tenancy by the entirety were it not for the intervening Bankruptcy,
and that since the property was not subject to transfer, released
the husband from all provable debts and prevents the Petitioner
from obtaining a Judgment against the Bankrupt and his wife
on the Notes.
The Court further stated, that this result could be
avoided if the Petitioner were able to secure and record a
Judgment against the Bankrupt and his wife, since this would
create a lien against the property which would not be affected
-15-

by a subsequent discharge.

The Referee ordered, that the discharge

of the Bankrupt be delayed in order that the Petitioner could
proceed against the entirety property in State Court.
The Court/ therefore, upheld the decision of the Referee
in allowing the Bankruptcy to be held up until there was a
completed state action as against the husband and wife.
It is, therefore, submitted to the Court that the Respondent
by failing to pursue its right to seek remedy in the Bankruptcy
Court as against the Bankrupt-spouse of the Appellant prevents
the Respondent from asserting its right against the entirety
interest of the Appellant and her spouse in the action adjudicated
by the Lower Court.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted to this Honorable Court, that the
Respondent had not only the opportunity but a duty to proceed
with its claim against the interest of the husband of the
Appellant in the Bankruptcy Court when the Respondent had full
knowledge of the listing of its indebtedness in the schedule
of the Bankrupt, and that the contention of the Respondent,
that it did not proceed in the Bankruptcy Court to establish
Respondent's claim as to the property of the husband, in that
the Respondent's claim was "invalid" as against the husband
should not allow the destruction of the estate of the husband
-16-

and wife in their personal property.

It is further submitted/

that the discharge in Bankruptcy of the husband and the filing
of an action in Replevin against the wife only for possession
of the family rights of the tenancy in the household furnishings
of a husband and wife is contradictory to the "fresh start"
theory propounded by innumerable United States Supreme Court
decisions in establishing the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act
and is contrary to the laws of the State of Utah.
Respectfully submitted,

PETE N. VLAHOS of VLAHOS & KNOWLTON
Attorney for Appellant
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A copy of the above and foregoing Brief of Appellant
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